COVID-19 outbreak in a personal service setting in Kingston, Ontario, 2020

• Published in: Canada communicable disease report Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 216 - 223
• Main Authors: Li, Anthony, Parent, Stéphanie, Kasmani, Azim, Guan, T Hugh, Moore, Kieran
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Canada Public Health Agency of Canada 07-05-2021
• Series: COVID-19: A year later
• Subjects: Beauty salons; case and contact management; Contact; Contact tracing; Coronaviruses; COVID-19; COVID-19 diagnostic tests; Deprivation; Disease transmission; Epidemics; Genomes; Hospitals; infection prevention and control; Infections; Laboratories; Outbreak; Outbreaks; Pandemics; personal service setting; Polymerase chain reaction; Public health; sars-cov-2; Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2; Social networks; superspreading event; Viral diseases; Workers; Canada; Ontario Canada; COVID-19; SARS-CoV-2; personal service setting; infection prevention and control; case and contact management; outbreak; superspreading event; public health
• ISSN: 1188-4169; 1481-8531; 1481-8531
• DOI: 10.14745/ccdr.v47i04a06

During the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, Ontario created a three-phase reopening framework for the economy. Outbreaks were expected at each phase. One week after Phase Two of reopening in the provincial public health administration region of Kingston, Frontenac, Lennox and Addington (KFL&A), a positive case was reported after three weeks of zero new COVID-19 cases. The objective of this report is to describe this COVID-19 outbreak, linked to a personal service setting (PSS), and the public health response to contain the outbreak.
The outbreak investigation included all COVID-19 cases in KFL&A between June 20, 2020 and July 3, 2020. Public health inspectors and nurses were rapidly deployed to inspect the PSS. A multimodal approach to high-volume testing involved fixed assessment centres, drive-through testing capacity and targeted testing at the outbreak site. Testing was conducted through a real-time polymerase chain reaction assay at the local Public Health Ontario laboratory.
Thirty-seven cases were associated with the outbreak: 38% through direct PSS exposure; 32% through household contact; and 30% through social and workplace contact. A superspreading event contributed to 38% of total cases. The majority of cases were in the low to mid-quintiles when analyzed for material deprivation. Testing rates increased four-fold compared to the prior baseline weeks in response to media attention and public health messaging, resulting in a low percent positivity.
The interplay of aggressive accessible testing, quick lab turnaround time, contact tracing within 24 hours of positive laboratory results as per provincial standards, frequent public communication, rapid inspections, mandatory self-isolation and face coverings were measures successful in halting the outbreak. Inspections or self-audits should be required at all PSSs prior to reopening and outbreak management must work with PSSs to reduce the possibility of superspreading events.