A Political Meaning of “Scientific Philosophy”? The Case of Edgar Zilsel

• Published in: Philosophia scientiae Vol. 22; no. 3; pp. 257 - 287
• Main Author: Oliver Schlaudt
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Éditions Kimé 25-10-2018
• ISSN: 1281-2463; 1775-4283
• DOI: 10.4000/philosophiascientiae.1650

Many scholars in the philosophy of science and the HOPOS community today appear to be keen for their expertise to be relevant to public concerns and debates. Early logical empiricism appears to provide a model of politically relevant philosophy of science. In his studies on the “depoliticization” of logical empiricism, George Reisch has rekindled wider awareness of the political agenda of (some sections of) the Vienna Circle, an agenda that faded away in the post-war US only under the pressure of anti-communist repression. In my study of the case of Edgar Zilsel, an early sociologist of science and politically radical member of the left wing of the Vienna Circle, I will show that logical empiricism cannot so easily be said to have been political. To be sure, Zilsel was a political intellectual—but he was not a political philosopher of science, i.e., his intention was not to intervene in public debate or to act in support of public causes by virtue of academic status (which he did not possess) or professional expertise (which he did). I shall argue further that contemporary debates about science in its social context conducted by scholars who are concerned about their impact on broader societal issues and who conceptualize social influence in terms of individuals’ motives and values are at odds with left-wing logical empiricism: this sought to provide a sociological account of science and focused on structural determinants rather than on individuals’ motives. Thus, even if logical empiricism could be shown to be a model of politically-relevant philosophy of science, it would point, I suggest, in a different direction to the one generally discussed by its contemporary heirs.