A side effect of a broker's expertise in clientelism: A lab‐experimental study

Drawing on studies from across the social sciences, this study explores a possibility that brokers affect vote choices via a psychological channel. Given that the information a broker utilizes for the efficient delivery of private transfers affects voters’ expectations of receiving those transfers,...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Bulletin of economic research Vol. 73; no. 3; pp. 393 - 410
Main Author:	Chang, Han Il
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Oxford Wiley Subscription Services, Inc 01-07-2021 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects:	broker Brokers Clientelism election lab‐experiment negative reciprocity Social sciences Voters Voting
Online Access:	Get full text
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Description
Summary:	Drawing on studies from across the social sciences, this study explores a possibility that brokers affect vote choices via a psychological channel. Given that the information a broker utilizes for the efficient delivery of private transfers affects voters’ expectations of receiving those transfers, neglected voters may defect from voting for the broker's boss out of anger resulting from frustrated expectations, and this is likely to be the case particularly in a competitive election and among indifferent voters. Results from a lab experiment are consistent with the proposed possibility.
ISSN:	0307-3378 1467-8586
DOI:	10.1111/boer.12254