Self-control and the self

• Published in: Synthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 199; no. 1-2; pp. 2183 - 2198
• Main Author: Altehenger, Hannah
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-12-2021; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Belief & doubt; Cognition & reasoning; Education; Epistemology; Logic; Metaphysics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Science; Self control; Two motivational systems views of self-control; Deep self views; Self-control; Self; Divided mind approach to self-control
• ISSN: 0039-7857; 1573-0964
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02877-9

Prima facie, it seems highly plausible to suppose that there is some kind of constitutive relationship between self-control and the self, i.e., that self-control is “control at the service of the self” or even “control by the self.” This belief is not only attractive from a pre-theoretical standpoint, but it also seems to be supported by theoretical reasons. In particular, there is a natural fit between a certain attractive approach to self-control—the so-called “divided mind approach”—and a certain well-established approach to the self—the so-called “deep self” approach. I argue, however, that this initial impression is misleading: on closer inspection, the combination of the divided mind approach to self-control with the deep self approach fails to provide us with a theoretical foundation for the claim that self-control is constitutively linked to the self. I show that, in an interesting twist, combining these two approaches actually supports the opposite claim, leading us to the view that self-control and the self can come apart, and, more specifically, that we sometimes exercise self-control without our self or even against our self.