The Dead Donor Rule: A Defense

• Published in: The Journal of medicine and philosophy Vol. 38; no. 4; pp. 426 - 440
• Main Author: BIRCH, Samuel C. M
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cary, NC Oxford University Press 01-08-2013
• Subjects: Bioethics; Brain Death; Death; Humans; Morals; Philosophy; Philosophy, Medical; Theory of values and moral philosophy; Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action; Tissue and Organ Procurement - ethics; Tissue Donors; Withholding Treatment - ethics; Ethics; Organ donation; Donor; allowing to die; killing; Death; dead donor rule; organ donation
• ISSN: 0360-5310; 1744-5019
• DOI: 10.1093/jmp/jht021

Miller, Truog, and Brock have recently argued that the "dead donor rule," the requirement that donors be determined to be dead before vital organs are procured for transplantation, cannot withstand ethical scrutiny. In their view, the dead donor rule is inconsistent with existing life-saving practices of organ transplantation, lacks a cogent ethical rationale, and is not necessary for maintenance of public trust in organ transplantation. In this paper, the second of these claims will be evaluated. (The first and third are not addressed.) The claim that the dead donor rule lacks a cogent ethical rationale will be shown to be an expression of the contemporary rejection of the moral significance of the traditional distinction between killing and allowing to die. The moral significance of this traditional distinction, and the associated norm that doctors should not kill their patients, will be defended, and this critique of it shown to be unsuccessful.