Users, Structures, and Representation
This article defends a pragmatic and structuralist account of scientific representation of the kind recently proposed by Bas van Fraassen against criticisms of both the structuralist and the pragmatist plank of the account. I argue that the account appears to have the unacceptable consequence that t...
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| Published in: | The British journal for the philosophy of science Vol. 66; no. 2; pp. 285 - 306 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford
Oxford University Press
01-06-2015
The University of Chicago Press Oxford Publishing Limited (England) |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | This article defends a pragmatic and structuralist account of scientific representation of the kind recently proposed by Bas van Fraassen against criticisms of both the structuralist and the pragmatist plank of the account. I argue that the account appears to have the unacceptable consequence that the domain of a theory is restricted to phenomena for which we actually have constructed a model—a worry arising from the account's pragmatism, which is exacerbated by its structuralism. Yet, the account has the resources, at least partially, to address the worry. What remains as implication is a strong anti-foundationalism. |
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| ISSN: | 0007-0882 1464-3537 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/bjps/axt032 |