Nowhere to hide: Response of corporate restructuring activities to mandatory segment disclosure

We examine the effect of mandatory financial disclosures, specifically SFAS 131, on corporate restructuring activities by using difference-in-differences (DiD) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) settings. After the adoption of SFAS 131, firms are less likely to engage in acquisitions than are...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of corporate finance (Amsterdam, Netherlands) Vol. 76; p. 102251
Main Authors: Le, Trinh Hue, Oliver, Barry, Tan, Kelvin Jui Keng
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier B.V 01-10-2022
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Summary:We examine the effect of mandatory financial disclosures, specifically SFAS 131, on corporate restructuring activities by using difference-in-differences (DiD) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) settings. After the adoption of SFAS 131, firms are less likely to engage in acquisitions than are the control firms. Furthermore, conditional on firms' engagement in acquisition activities, acquirers are less likely to complete their initiated acquisition deals, especially for those value-destroying deals. After the implementation of SFAS 131, we find that the equity market reacts positively to large and diversifying deals that are subject to mandatory segment disclosures. Overall, our results suggest that the segment disclosure standard helped prevent managers from undertaking new, value-destroying M&As post-SFAS 131. Finally, these SFAS 131–induced corporate restructuring activities are shown to help reduce the risk of a stock price crash.
ISSN:0929-1199
1872-6313
DOI:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102251