Perfect Allies? The Case of Iraq and Al Qaeda

Four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, many scholars and policy makers concluded that an alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda did not exist. Yet the absence of this alliance raises a puzzle: Given their mutual interest in opposing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, why wasn't there an allian...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:International studies perspectives Vol. 8; no. 3; pp. 272 - 286
Main Authors: Bapat, Navin A., Ertley, Daniel, Hall, Chansonette, Lancaster, Mark
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Oxford Blackwell Publishing 01-08-2007
Oxford University Press
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Summary:Four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, many scholars and policy makers concluded that an alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda did not exist. Yet the absence of this alliance raises a puzzle: Given their mutual interest in opposing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, why wasn't there an alliance between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden? In this essay, we develop an explanation for why Iraq and al Qaeda did not ally using previous scholarly work on bargaining and alliances. Our explanation concludes that Iraq and al Qaeda failed to form an alliance due to mutual fears of opportunism and the problem of credible commitment. We conclude by presenting evidence for our explanation and offering a policy prescription for governments facing threats of state sponsored terrorism.
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ISSN:1528-3577
1528-3585
DOI:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2007.00289.x