Philosophical Anti-authoritarianism

• Published in: Philosophia (Ramat Gan) Vol. 44; no. 4; pp. 1333 - 1349
• Main Author: Futter, Dylan B.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-12-2016
• Subjects: Education; Epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science; Commentary; Disagreement; Authority; Analytical philosophy; Metaphilosophy
• ISSN: 0048-3893; 1574-9274
• DOI: 10.1007/s11406-016-9781-0

Unlike certain commentary traditions of philosophy in which deference to an authoritative author was a central feature, there are within the analytical tradition no recognised authorities to whom the reader is required to defer. This paper takes up the question of whether this anti-authoritarian position in philosophy can be sustained. Three lines of argument are considered. According to the first, there are no credible authorities in philosophy, or, even if there were, these authorities could not be identified by the non-expert reader. According to the second, since no philosopher is infallible, many readers have on many occasions epistemic grounds for non-deference to the author. According to the third, even if some readers have epistemic reason for deference to some authors, an anti-authoritarian stance can be justified in terms of distinctively philosophical values such as conceptual understanding or intellectual autonomy. Although each of these lines of argument contains an element of truth, a sufficient justification for philosophical anti-authoritarianism remains surprisingly elusive.