Facts and Values After David Hume

• Published in: International journal for the semiotics of law = Revue internationale de sémiotique juridique Vol. 36; no. 1; pp. 17 - 29
• Main Author: Määttänen, Pentti
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-02-2023
• Subjects: Applied Linguistics; Fundamentals of Law; Law; Law and Criminolgy; Legal History; Philosophy of Law; Theories of Law
• ISSN: 0952-8059; 1572-8722
• DOI: 10.1007/s11196-022-09922-5

According to David Hume values do not belong to the world of facts and cannot be derived from facts. However, Hume’s argument is based on questionable presumptions. His conception of experience as sense perception is erroneous. On contemporary standards it is simply false because sense organs are not channels that passively receive inputs from the world. It is too narrow as it does not take the role of action into account. Further, Hume’s argument is based on the dichotomy between external and internal. Mind is strictly separated from the external world of facts. This entails that experiences, perceptions and ideas do not belong to the world of facts. Causality and values cannot be literally perceived. Therefore they are beyond the scope of empirical knowledge. Hume’s presumptions can be rejected. The consequence is that mind is embodied, and bodies belong to the world of facts. And so do embodied minds. Broadening the notion of experience brings causality and values within the scope of experience. They are experienced on a daily basis in various practices. Values related to vital needs are based on biological facts. More generally, the relation of facts and values can be analyzed if one rejects the hidden causes of perceptions as the object of knowledge. The alternative is the operational conception of knowledge. To know is to know what to do in order to proceed from a problematic situation to future circumstances where the problems are solved.