Epistemic instrumentalism and the problem of epistemic blame

• Published in: Synthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 204; no. 3; p. 110
• Main Author: Dyke, Michelle M.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 15-09-2024; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Education; Epistemology; Logic; Metaphysics; Original Research; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Science; Rationality; Reasons; Blame; Epistemic normativity; Instrumentalism; Social epistemology
• ISSN: 1573-0964; 0039-7857; 1573-0964
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04766-x

In this paper, I draw attention to the phenomenon of warranted epistemic blame in order to pose a challenge for most forms of epistemic instrumentalism, which is the view that all of the demands of epistemic normativity are requirements of instrumental rationality. Because of the way in which the instrumentalist takes the force of one’s epistemic reasons to derive from one’s own individually held ends, the instrumentalist faces unique difficulties in explaining our standing to blame one another for violations of epistemic norms. In many cases, it is unclear why, according to the instrumentalist, we might be entitled to others’ adherence to epistemic norms at all. This is a serious problem. The upshot is that theorists of epistemic normativity should be prepared reject most forms of epistemic instrumentalism.