Corrigendum to “Informational externalities and emergence of consensus” [Games Econ. Behav. 66 (2) (2009) 979–994]

Rosenberg et al. (2009) studied the convergence of equilibrium behavior to consensus in social networks. In this corrigendum, we correct the condition required for one of their results to hold.

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Games and economic behavior Vol. 144; pp. 395 - 396
Main Authors:	Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier Inc 01-03-2024
Subjects:	C11 C73 D83 C72
Online Access:	Get full text
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Description
Summary:	Rosenberg et al. (2009) studied the convergence of equilibrium behavior to consensus in social networks. In this corrigendum, we correct the condition required for one of their results to hold.
Bibliography:	erratum
ISSN:	0899-8256 1090-2473
DOI:	10.1016/j.geb.2024.01.009