Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy Positioning towards Russia and its Impact on the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War: A Hedging Strategy

• Published in: Review of international affairs Vol. 75; no. 1190; pp. 55 - 82
• Main Authors: Jović-Lazić, Ana, Bošković, Stefan
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade 01-03-2024
• Subjects: azerbaijan; foreign policy; hedging strategy; russia; second nagorno-karabakh war
• ISSN: 0486-6096; 2955-9030
• DOI: 10.18485/iipe_ria.2024.75.1190.3

A theoretical framework rooted in hedging is used to analyse how Azerbaijan’s foreign policy towards Russia evolved and its significant impact on the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy positioning, viewed through this prism, illustrates how smaller states can strategically manage relations with larger neighbours and competitors and achieve their interests. The primary hypothesis is that the calculated foreign policy of Azerbaijan’s strategy towards Russia, based on the abovementioned strategy, created the conditions for the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and decisively influenced its course and outcome. Researchers use document analysis and discourse analysis to assess the evolution of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy towards Russia, analysing their bilateral relations based primarily on political, economic, and societal cooperation. This approach relies on various academic sources, including scientific articles, books, documents, agreements, and statements by different state actors, to assess the evolution of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy towards Russia, analysing their bilateral relations based primarily on political, economic, and societal cooperation. In this foreign policy context, the article also assesses the significance of Turkey’s strategic support for Azerbaijan and the strengthening of its military capacities. The research findings indicate that Baku, deviating from previous unilateral decisions, skillfully balanced its relations with Moscow. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy manoeuvring, which implies careful avoidance of provoking Russia, significantly impacted the outbreak, course, and outcome of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.