Moral testimony another defense

• Published in: Filosofia Unisinos Vol. 25; no. 2; pp. 1 - 12
• Main Author: Zhuang, Xuanpu
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English; Portuguese
• Published: Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos - UNISINOS 26-07-2024
• Subjects: PHILOSOPHY; testemunho moral; moral understanding; julgamento moral; moral testimony; moral judgment; divisão do trabalho epistêmico; compreensão moral; the division of epistemic labor
• ISSN: 1519-5023; 1984-8234; 1984-8234
• DOI: 10.4013/fsu.2024.252.08

According to some pessimists, trusting moral testimony is an action in which the agent does not think about moral questions by herself, and thus it is unacceptable. I argue for optimism by giving some reasons to display moral agents are still depending upon their own in many cases of moral testimony. Specifically, I argue that testimony is a form of social cooperation: the division of epistemic labor. My strategy is as follows: First, I give a principle to show when an agent could reasonably trust moral testimony. Specifically, an agent could reasonably accept the testimony, when she can reasonably expect she would make the same or similar judgment with the testifier. Second, I show how moral testimony could work as a form of social cooperation. Given the principle of the same judgment, it is reasonable for the agent to form a moral belief and act with moral testimony. And it provides us higher efficiency in moral knowledge and shows respect for each moral agent. After that, I provide explanations for the problem of moral disagreement and moral understanding with such a principle for moral testimony. Finally, I respond to some possible objections and give some clarifications of my argument.