Behavior in long‐run projects and elicited time preferences
Abstract We investigate behavior in long‐run projects and its relationship with experimentally elicited time preferences. Participants engage in a longitudinal project requiring sustained real effort, with their time preferences estimated through monetary outcomes. We observe a tendency to front‐loa...
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| Published in: | Managerial and decision economics |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
04-10-2024
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| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Abstract We investigate behavior in long‐run projects and its relationship with experimentally elicited time preferences. Participants engage in a longitudinal project requiring sustained real effort, with their time preferences estimated through monetary outcomes. We observe a tendency to front‐load real effort, with choices reflecting both present and future bias, the former being more prevalent and severe. We also find evidence of naive choice reversals. However, there is no support for the quasi‐hyperbolic discounting model in monetary choices, and its predictions do not align with real effort allocation patterns. Nevertheless, discount rate and present bias parameters derived from monetary outcomes demonstrate predictive power over real effort allocation. |
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| ISSN: | 0143-6570 1099-1468 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/mde.4396 |