Cyborgs and moral identity

Neuroscience and technological medicine in general increasingly faces us with the imminent reality of cyborgs—integrated part human and part machine complexes. If my brain functions in a way that is supported by and exploits intelligent technology both external and implantable, then how should I be...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of medical ethics Vol. 32; no. 2; pp. 79 - 83
Main Author: Gillett, G
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: England BMJ Publishing Group Ltd and Institute of Medical Ethics 01-02-2006
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Summary:Neuroscience and technological medicine in general increasingly faces us with the imminent reality of cyborgs—integrated part human and part machine complexes. If my brain functions in a way that is supported by and exploits intelligent technology both external and implantable, then how should I be treated and what is my moral status—am I a machine or am I a person? I explore a number of scenarios where the balance between human and humanoid machine shifts, and ask questions about the moral status of the individuals concerned. The position taken is very much in accordance with the Aristotelian idea that our moral behaviour is of a piece with our social and personal skills and forms a reactive and reflective component of those skills.
Bibliography:href:medethics-32-79.pdf
PMID:16446411
istex:FCAA6A4D1CBA1A139705EBDEA5EED0AA5C845543
local:0320079
Correspondence to:
 G Gillett
 Professor of Biomedical Ethics, University of Otago, Box 913, Dunedin, New Zealand; grant.gillett@stonebow.otago.ac.nz
ark:/67375/NVC-V8Q7ZM7G-G
ObjectType-Article-2
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-3
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ObjectType-Review-1
ISSN:0306-6800
1473-4257
DOI:10.1136/jme.2005.012583