Motivated Cultural Cognition The Impact of Implicit Cultural Theories on Dispositional Attribution Varies as a Function of Need for Closure

The authors propose that need for closure (NFC) leads attributors to respond to an ambiguous social event by increasing reliance on implicit theories received from acculturation. Hence, the influence of NFC should be shaped by chronically accessible knowledge structures in a culture, and, likewise,...

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Published in:Journal of personality and social psychology Vol. 78; no. 2; pp. 247 - 259
Main Authors: Chiu, Chi-yue, Morris, Michael W, Menon, Tanya, Hong, Ying-yi
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Washington, DC American Psychological Association 01-02-2000
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Summary:The authors propose that need for closure (NFC) leads attributors to respond to an ambiguous social event by increasing reliance on implicit theories received from acculturation. Hence, the influence of NFC should be shaped by chronically accessible knowledge structures in a culture, and, likewise, the influence of culture should be moderated by epistemic motives such as NFC. The specific hypotheses drew on past findings that North American and Chinese attributors possess differing implicit social theories, North Americans conceiving of individuals as autonomous agents and Chinese conceiving of groups as autonomous. The present studies found the predicted pattern that among North American participants, NFC increased attributions to personal but not group dispositions. Among Chinese participants, NFC increased attributions to group but not personal dispositions. The findings are discussed in light of an emerging dynamic account of culture and cognition.
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ISSN:0022-3514
1939-1315
DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.78.2.247