On The Observational Equivalence Of Managerial Contracts Un

Two models of contracting under asymmetric information (moral hazard and self selection) are used to explain the phenomenon of managerial contracts often tying compensation to the firm's performance. An important direction for research in this area will be to use data on managerial contracts to...

Full description

Bibliographic Details

Published in:	The Quarterly journal of economics Vol. 103; no. 2; p. 425
Main Authors:	Hagerty, Kathleen M, Siegel, Daniel R
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Oxford Oxford University Press 01-05-1988
Subjects:	Contracts Economic models Economic theory Hazards Managers Moral Moral hazard Profit maximization Selection Self Utility functions
Online Access:	Get full text
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!