Chronic and Stable? Investigating the Occurrence and Duration of Minimal Winning Coalitions in Western Europe (1945–2021)

• Published in: Journal of contemporary European research Vol. 19; no. 1
• Main Author: Marco Improta
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: UACES 01-07-2023
• Subjects: government duration; government formation; minimal winning coalitions; office seeking; Western Europe
• ISSN: 1815-347X
• DOI: 10.30950/jcer.v19i1.1265

Coalition governments have prompted a stream of prominent research since the birth of modern political science. Several studies have been performed on the lifecycles of cabinets, focusing particularly on their formation and duration. The first investigations into such issues were carried out using game theoretic approaches. In their groundbreaking works, William Riker and Lawrence Dodd argued that office-seeking outcomes, i.e. minimal winning coalitions, are more frequent and stable than other cabinet types. However, more recent research seems to suggest that these propositions are disputable. By relying on an original multilevel dataset of about 700 cabinets in 20 Western European countries from 1945 to 2021, this study tests whether minimal winning coalitions are more recurrent and durable than different government formulae. The analysis finds that a) such coalitions have been less frequent than oversized majority cabinets throughout the time span considered, particularly during economically turbulent times; b) despite recording higher levels of actual duration, minimal winning coalitions are not significantly more durable than other cabinet types; and c) minimal winning coalitions occur in both polarised and less polarised West European political systems. By verifying office-based game theoretic propositions, this study contributes to the scientific examination of two fundamental stages of democratic governance in Europe.