Merleau-Ponty's Hegelianism

• Main Author: Nagel, Christopher Paul
• Format: Dissertation
• Language: English
• Subjects: philosophy

In the Prefaces to Phenomenology of Perception and Sense and Non-Sense, Merleau-Ponty cites Hegel's influence on 20th century philosophy. Merleau-Ponty repeatedly addresses Hegel throughout his career, less for the purpose of interpreting Hegel than for the sake of renewing Hegel's philosophy. This dissertation gives the first systematic account in English of Merleau-Ponty's appropriation of Hegel.
Through the first four chapters, I articulate Merleau-Ponty's Hegelianism in the notions of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, freedom, history, and finally of philosophy. In each case, Merleau-Ponty takes up what he considers Hegel's greatest contributions--the notions of the dialectical development of the world and the concrete rationality rationality the world exhibits. At every stage, Merleau-Ponty praises Hegel for providing philosophical insight into these themes, and criticizes Hegel for over-rationalizing. In other words, while Hegel addresses the real world in terms of an ideal reason the world always approximates, Merleau-Ponty returns to the real reason founded in perception. This central difference in their views can be seen reflected in the titles of their two early works: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit versus Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception.
In the final two chapters, I describe two attempts at post-Hegelian philosophy. The first is Merleau-Ponty's own, in The Visible and the Invisible. Here, Merleau-Ponty claims that dialectic exceeds its warrant as a philosophical method, and must be balanced by a "hyperdialectic," or by "reversibility." Merleau-Ponty died before giving these notions a full account; however, his final lecture course on "Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel" shows that Merleau-Ponty's critical reflection on dialectic was central to the development of "reversibility.".
The second post-Hegelianism I address in Foucault's. Foucault's critique of the modern episteme appears radically to undermine all Hegelian views, including Merleau-Ponty's. Yet it may be that Hegel's own position permits a kind of mutual recognition of these approaches.