Presidential cabinets, electoral cycles, and coalition discipline in Brazil

• Published in: Dados (Rio de Janeiro) Vol. 43; no. 3; pp. 479 - 519
• Main Author: Neto, Octavio Amorim
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: Portuguese
• Published: Rio de Janeiro Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, IESP 01-01-2000
• Subjects: Advisory Committees; Brazil; Coalitions; Councils; Legislation; Policy Making; Politicians; Presidents; Public Officials
• ISSN: 0011-5258; 1678-4588
• DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582000000300003

All presidential cabinets formed in Brazil between 1985 and 1998 included politicians from more than one party and could, in principle, be defined as coalition cabinets. The article evaluates to what extent this is a valid statement as far as the legislative behavior of the cabinet parties is concerned. An indicator is proposed for measuring the rate of cabinet coalescence, based on the ratio between the percentage of ministerial posts held by each party represented in the cabinet and the percentage of legislative seats held by each of these parties. Regression analysis is used to ascertain what impact the rate of cabinet coalescence has on the legislative discipline of cabinet parties. In addition to this coalescence index, the study also tests the effect of electoral cycles and the ideological range of cabinets on legislative discipline. Results indicate that the legislative discipline of cabinet parties is only consistent with what would be expected of coalition governments in parliamentary regimes when the cabinet displays a relatively high rate of coalescence. Findings also show that the party support to president tends to decrease over the course of the president's term and that the greater the ideological distance between the president and a given party, the lower the support rate this party will display for the head of government.