Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time
We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement, and preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. We show that there may exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in t...
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| Published in: | Economics bulletin Vol. 35; no. 3; pp. 1744 - 1751 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
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Economics Bulletin
2015
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| Abstract | We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement, and preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. We show that there may exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model under which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. For an inefficient equilibrium to exist, the status quo wage must be sufficiently low and the amounts that the firm offers for itself in the subgame perfect equilibrium under the exogenous always strike decision in every odd period before reaching an agreement must be sufficiently low. |
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| AbstractList | We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement, and preferences of the union and the firm are expressed by sequences of discount rates varying in time. We show that there may exist inefficient subgame perfect equilibria in the model under which the union engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching a final agreement. For an inefficient equilibrium to exist, the status quo wage must be sufficiently low and the amounts that the firm offers for itself in the subgame perfect equilibrium under the exogenous always strike decision in every odd period before reaching an agreement must be sufficiently low. |
| Author | Ozkardas, Ahmet Rusinowska, Agnieszka |
| Author_xml | – sequence: 1 givenname: Ahmet surname: Ozkardas fullname: Ozkardas, Ahmet organization: Turgut Ozal University – sequence: 2 givenname: Agnieszka orcidid: 0000-0003-3803-9907 surname: Rusinowska fullname: Rusinowska, Agnieszka organization: Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne |
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| Snippet | We consider a union-firm wage bargaining in which the union must choose between strike and holdout in case of disagreement, and preferences of the union and... |
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| Title | Inefficient equilibria in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time |
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