Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others

• Published in: The American political science review Vol. 100; no. 2; pp. 165 - 181
• Main Authors: IVERSEN, TORBEN, SOSKICE, DAVID
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York, USA Cambridge University Press 01-05-2006
• Subjects: Coalition governments; Coalitions; Democracy; Distribution; Economic models; Egalitarianism; Elections; Electoral Systems; Evidence; Government; Government (Administrative Body); Income inequality; Income redistribution; Income taxes; Low income groups; Middle class; Partisanship; Party systems; Plurality voting; Political Economy; Political Ideologies; Political Parties; Political partisanship; Political science; Political systems; Political theory; Politics; Poverty; Social classes; Taxation; Taxes; Voters; Voting
• ISSN: 0003-0554; 1537-5943
• DOI: 10.1017/S0003055406062083

Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard (1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We develop a general model of redistribution that explains why some democratic governments are more prone to redistribute than others. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, hence redistribution. Our argument implies (1) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, whereas center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems; and (2) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.