The peer effects of corporate poverty alleviation behavior: Empirical evidence from China
This study explores the peer and economic effects of corporate poverty alleviation behavior. Using the data of A-share non-financial listed corporates in Shanghai and Shenzhen of China from 2016 to 2020, the empirical analysis of this study finds that: corporate poverty alleviation behavior has sign...
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Published in: | PloS one Vol. 19; no. 7; p. e0304252 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
United States
Public Library of Science
15-07-2024
Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | This study explores the peer and economic effects of corporate poverty alleviation behavior. Using the data of A-share non-financial listed corporates in Shanghai and Shenzhen of China from 2016 to 2020, the empirical analysis of this study finds that: corporate poverty alleviation behavior has significant peer effects; the guidance of local poverty alleviation policies weakens the peer effects of corporate poverty alleviation behavior; compared to private enterprises, the poverty alleviation behavior of the peer firms has a more significant impact on state-owned enterprises; and corporate poverty alleviation behavior can result in the backflow of economic benefits and achieve the organic unity of economic and social benefits. The purpose of this paper is to explore the peer effects of corporate poverty alleviation behaviors through empirical analysis using available public data. The results of the study not only increase the motivation of corporate to participate in poverty alleviation from a peer effects perspective, but also reveal key factors for sustaining corporate poverty alleviation behaviors. |
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Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23 Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist. |
ISSN: | 1932-6203 1932-6203 |
DOI: | 10.1371/journal.pone.0304252 |