Private information, transferable utility, and the core

We consider transferable-utility, cooperative games, featuring differently informed players. Parties can exchange endowments or undertake joint production, but not pool information. Coalitional contracts must therefore comply with members' private information. Qualitatively different shadow pri...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Economic theory Vol. 42; no. 3; pp. 591 - 609
Main Authors:	Flåm, S. D, Koutsougeras, L
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Berlin/Heidelberg Berlin/Heidelberg : Springer-Verlag 01-03-2010 Springer Springer-Verlag Springer Nature B.V
Subjects:	Atoms Commercial production Commodities Cooperative game Core Differential information Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Endowment Endowments Euclidean space Exchange economy Game Theory Information theory International economics Lagrangian duality Lagrangian function Microeconomics Public Finance Research Article Resource ownership Shadow prices Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Transferable utility Value of information Lagrangian duality D51 Exchange economy Differential information Transferable utility Value of information C71 C62 Cooperative game Core D82
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