Reassessing the Links between Regime Type and Economic Performance: Why Some Authoritarian Regimes Show Stable Growth and Others Do Not

• Published in: British journal of political science Vol. 45; no. 2; pp. 253 - 285
• Main Authors: Chandra, Siddharth, Rudra, Nita
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01-04-2015
• Subjects: Authoritarianism; Authoritarianism (Political Ideology); Autocracy; Citizen participation; Decentralization; Decision making; Democracy; Dues and Fees; Economic Development; Economic growth; Economic Policy; Economic stabilization; Negotiation; Policy Making; Political leadership; Political science; Political Systems; Political theory; Shrinkage; Volatility
• ISSN: 0007-1234; 1469-2112
• DOI: 10.1017/S0007123413000355

This analysis challenges claims that regime type determines national economic performance, and hypothesizes that the level of public deliberation, rather than broad categories of regime type, is the driver of national economic performance across political systems; specifically, that negotiations, disagreements, and compromises between decentralized decision-making partisans (e.g., citizens, business representatives, professional associations, labor, and public administrators) are the underlying causal mechanism explaining the non-monotonic relationship between different types of political system and economic performance. Countries with high levels of public deliberation more often experience stable growth outcomes, while other countries can make radical changes in economic policy with uncertain outcome. The variation in public deliberation within regime type is significant, especially amongst authoritarian regimes. One startling implication is that, in certain situations, impressive gains in economic growth can be achieved only at the expense of active negotiation and participation in the policy-making process.