Do Differences in Presidential Economic Advisers Matter?

• Published in: Public choice Vol. 142; no. 3/4; pp. 279 - 291
• Main Author: Goff, Brian
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Boston Springer 01-03-2010; Springer US; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Advisors; Antitrust; Case studies; Data analysis; Economic growth rate; Economic policy; Economics; Economics and Finance; Economists; Effects; Employment; Expenditures; Experts; Federal regulation; Government Spending; Heads of state; Human capital; Incentives; Ivy; Marginal tax rate; Market share; Median voter model; Policy making; Political appointments; Political Science; Politics; Preferences; Presidential advisers; Presidents; Public Finance; Public good; Regulation; Studies; Tax policy; Tax rates; Taxation; Time series; United States of America; Upper houses; Voters; United States > US; Economic policy; Presidential advisers
• ISSN: 0048-5829; 1573-7101
• DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9549-1

Using data on members on the Council of Economic Advisors as well as US Treasury secretaries and OMB directors from 1952 through 2005, I investigate the effect of economic advisors' educational and employment backgrounds on the time series performance of several policy variables. Ivy League advisors appear to raise non-defense government spending, although the size of the impact differs by president. While voter preferences appear to matter for a wider variety of policy variables (changes in federal regulation and marginal tax rates), the share of Ivy League advisors is at least as important as voter preferences in explaining non-defense spending.