The new calculus of pre-emption

• Published in: Survival (London) Vol. 44; no. 4; pp. 53 - 80
• Main Author: Litwak, Robert S.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: London Informa UK Ltd 01-12-2002; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: Diplomacy; Disarmament; Military Intervention; Military policy; Military Strategy; National Security; Terrorism; United States of America; United States; US
• ISSN: 0039-6338; 1468-2699
• DOI: 10.1080/00396330212331343492

Under the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy document, military pre-emption against 'rogue states' and terrorist groups has been elevated to official doctrine. But the conditions under which pre-emption would be undertaken remain unclear. Military action against terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, enjoys broad international legitimacy, but that consensus breaks down over the use of force against a state violating non-proliferation norms. A comparative analysis of historical cases reveals force to be as problematic as its non-military alternatives. Inadequate intelligence, concern over collateral damage to civilian populations and the fear of triggering a broader conflict have been major constraints on the use of force to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the post-11 September era, pre-emption should be a rarely invoked policy option, and successful prevention strategies, employing non-military instruments, might forestall the need to resort to it.