Informal Social Networks and Rational Voting

• Published in: British journal of political science Vol. 41; no. 2; pp. 229 - 257
• Main Authors: Abrams, Samuel, Iversen, Torben, Soskice, David
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Cambridge, UK Cambridge University Press 01-04-2011
• Subjects: Econometrics; Economic models; Elections; Ethics; Group behaviour; Group incentives; Incentives; Majority voting; Mobilization; Participation; Political elections; Political participation; Political parties; Political science; Psychology; Rational Choice; Rational choice theory; Social approval; Social Groups; Social networking; Social Networks; Social psychology; Sociology; Voter behavior; Voter turnout; Voters; Voting; Voting behavior; Voting behaviour; Voting turnout
• ISSN: 0007-1234; 1469-2112
• DOI: 10.1017/S0007123410000499

Classical rational choice explanations of voting participation are widely thought to have failed. This article argues that the currently dominant Group Mobilization and Ethical Agency approaches have serious shortcomings in explaining individually rational turnout. It develops an informal social network (ISN) model in which people rationally vote if their informal networks of family and friends attach enough importance to voting, because voting leads to social approval and vice versa. Using results from the social psychology literature, research on social groups in sociology and their own survey data, the authors argue that the ISN model can explain individually rational non-altruistic turnout. If group variables that affect whether voting is used as a marker of individual standing in groups are included, the likelihood of turnout rises dramatically.