Optimal Allocation of TAC and the Implications of Implementing an ITQ Management System for the North-East Arctic Cod

First, we study the allocation rule applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. Second, we explore the bioeconomic implications of an ITQ management system for this fishery. A model combining a cannibalistic biomodel with cooperative game theory...

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Published in:Land economics Vol. 77; no. 3; pp. 350 - 359
Main Authors: Armstrong, Claire W., Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Madison University of Wisconsin Press 01-08-2001
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Abstract First, we study the allocation rule applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. Second, we explore the bioeconomic implications of an ITQ management system for this fishery. A model combining a cannibalistic biomodel with cooperative game theory is developed. Key results from the study are (1) the current allocation rule acts in opposite fashion to what may be considered bioeconomically optimal; and (2) an ITQ system for this fishery is likely to result in economic losses, as the biological advantages of harvesting with the two vessels types may be lost.
AbstractList To manage its portion of the northeast Arctic cod fishery, Norway uses an allocation rule for splitting the Norwegian total allowable catch (TAC) between coastal and trawler vessels. The study developed a mathematic simulation model to evaluate the bioeconomic effectiveness of the current allocation rule and to explore the bioeconomic implications of introducing an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) management system. The simulations combined a model of predation by mature cod on immature cod with cooperative game theory to determine the bioeconomically optimal TAC allocation. Modeling results showed that the existing allocation rule acts in opposite fashion to what would be considered bioeconomically optimal, leading to economic losses. Implementation of an ITQ system would also likely result in economic losses, because it would probably concentrate the TAC within one vessel group so that the biological advantages of fishing with the two vessel types would be lost.
This paper studies the allocation rule applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. It also explores the bioeconomic implications of an ITQ management system for this fishery. A model combining a cannibalistic bio-model with cooperative game theory is developed. Key results from the study are: 1. the current allocation rule acts in opposite fashion to what may be considered bioeconomically optimal, 2. economic losses, as the biological advantages of harvesting with the 2 vessels types may be lost.
First, we study the allocation rule applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. Second, we explore the bioeconomic implications of an ITQ management system for this fishery. A model combining a cannibalistic biomodel with cooperative game theory is developed. Key results from the study are (1) the current allocation rule acts in opposite fashion to what may be considered bioeconomically optimal; and (2) an ITQ system for this fishery is likely to result in economic losses, as the biological advantages of harvesting with the two vessels types may be lost.
Author Armstrong, Claire W.
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
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Snippet First, we study the allocation rule applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. Second, we explore the...
This paper studies the allocation rule applied to split the Norwegian total allowable catch for cod between coastal and trawler vessels. It also explores the...
To manage its portion of the northeast Arctic cod fishery, Norway uses an allocation rule for splitting the Norwegian total allowable catch (TAC) between...
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SubjectTerms Allocations
Animal cannibalism
Arctic Region
Decision making
Economic models
Economic theory
Economics
Environment
Environmental management
Fisheries
Fisheries management
Fishery economics
Fishery industry
Fishery management
Fishery resources
Fishing industry
Game theory
Individual fishing quotas
Individual transferable quota
Land economics
Management
Ocean fisheries
Quota systems
Sustainable fisheries management
Total allowable catch
Total allowable catches
Trawlers
Title Optimal Allocation of TAC and the Implications of Implementing an ITQ Management System for the North-East Arctic Cod
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