Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations

• Published in: Journal of regional science Vol. 59; no. 1; pp. 118 - 144
• Main Authors: Miyagiwa, Kaz, Sato, Yasuhiro
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Heightstown Blackwell Publishers Inc 01-01-2019
• Subjects: Border stations; Borders; Destinations; Employment; Enforcement; Equilibrium; equilibrium unemployment; illegal immigration; Immigration; Immigration policy; immigration policy competition; job search; Labor force; multiple destinations; Undocumented immigrants; Unemployment; Welfare
• ISSN: 0022-4146; 1467-9787
• DOI: 10.1111/jors.12408

We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves insufficient compared with the joint optimum, calling for enforcement by federal authorities. Absent such authorities, delegating border control to the country with a larger native labor force can improve each destination country’s welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is efficient, obviating enforcement by supranational authorities.