Formal modelling and analysis of DNP3 secure authentication

• Published in: Journal of network and computer applications Vol. 59; pp. 345 - 360
• Main Authors: Amoah, Raphael, Camtepe, Seyit, Foo, Ernest
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Elsevier Ltd 01-01-2016
• Subjects: CPN; DNP3; DNP3-SA; Formal methods; SCADA; Smart grid; CPN; Formal methods; Smart grid; DNP3; DNP3-SA; SCADA
• ISSN: 1084-8045; 1095-8592
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jnca.2015.05.015

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are one of the key foundations of smart grids. The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) is a standard SCADA protocol designed to facilitate communications in substations and smart grid nodes. The protocol is embedded with a security mechanism called Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA). This mechanism ensures that end-to-end communication security is provided in substations. This paper presents a formal model for the behavioural analysis of DNP3-SA using Coloured Petri Nets (CPN). Our DNP3-SA CPN model is capable of testing and verifying various attack scenarios: modification, replay and spoofing, combined complex attack and mitigation strategies. Using the model has revealed a previously unidentified flaw in the DNP3-SA protocol that can be exploited by an attacker that has access to the network interconnecting DNP3 devices. An attacker can launch a successful attack on an outstation without possessing the pre-shared keys by replaying a previously authenticated command with arbitrary parameters. We propose an update to the DNP3-SA protocol that removes the flaw and prevents such attacks. The update is validated and verified using our CPN model proving the effectiveness of the model and importance of the formal protocol analysis.