A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule
Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked,J. Econ. Theory63(1994), 219–245) proved that the uniform rule of the fair division problem, where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto op...
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| Published in: | Journal of economic theory Vol. 69; no. 1; pp. 255 - 261 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York
Elsevier Inc
01-04-1996
Elsevier Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc |
| Series: | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked,J. Econ. Theory63(1994), 219–245) proved that the uniform rule of the fair division problem, where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto optimal, and envy-free, in a setting of an infinite number of potential agents. We show that the uniqueness of the uniform rule is achieved without assuming continuity, even in a setting of a finite number of potential agents. A similar result is obtained by replacing envy-freeness with individual rationality from equal division.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D63, C71 |
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-2 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 23 |
| ISSN: | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| DOI: | 10.1006/jeth.1996.0051 |