Using Multiple Means of Determination

• Published in: International studies in the philosophy of science Vol. 27; no. 3; pp. 295 - 313
• Main Authors: Schickore, Jutta, Coko, Klodian
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Abingdon Routledge 01-09-2013; Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Subjects: Community; Convergence; Determinism; Epistemology; Philosophy of science; Practice; Scientific research
• ISSN: 0269-8595; 1469-9281
• DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2013.825498

This article examines a metaphilosophical issue, namely existing disagreements in philosophy of science about the significance of using multiple means of determination in scientific practice. We argue that this disagreement can, in part, be resolved by separating different questions that can be asked about the use of multiple means of determination, including the following: what can be concluded from the convergence of data or the convergence of claims about phenomena? Are the conclusions drawn from the convergence of data and of statements about phenomena of special importance to the debate about realism and antirealism? Do inferences based on multiple means of determination have stronger epistemic force than inferences that are secured in other ways? Is the epistemic goal of deploying multiple means of determination well entrenched within the scientific community? Most of these questions can be discussed both in a formal and in an empirical perspective. If the differences in perspective are taken into account, some disagreements can be easily resolved. In part, however, the disagreements reflect historiographical challenges that are very difficult, if not impossible to meet.