Agricultural Power in the European Community: Explaining the Fate of CAP and GATT Negotiations

• Published in: Comparative politics Vol. 28; no. 2; pp. 127 - 149
• Main Author: Keeler, John T. S.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: New York, etc City University of New York 01-01-1996; City University of New York, Political Science Program, etc; Transaction Inc
• Subjects: Agrarian reform; Agricultural policy; Agricultural subsidies; Agriculture; AGRICULTURE (INCLUDING HUNTING AND GATHERING); Common Agricultural Policy; Common markets; Europe; European Community (EC); European Union; Farm economics; Farm exports; Farmers; Farming communities; Farms; GATT; GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); Industrial agriculture; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; Negotiation; Policy making; PRESSURE GROUP; Trade policy; Trade relations; Europe
• DOI: 10.2307/421978
• EISSN: 2151-6227
• ISSN: 0010-4159

The European Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has long been criticized for burdening consumers and taxpayers, stimulating surplus production, and distorting international agricultural trade. As the agricultural population has declined, acceptance of these negative economic effects has appeared increasingly baffling to critics. The EC farm lobby has exerted power to block or dilute liberal reforms and to jeopardize GATT accords largely because of its asymmetrical interest in the CAP, organizational clout, and disproportionate enfranchisement in the EC and nationally. The traditional pillars of support for the CAP have recently been weakened, but agro-power in the EC remains formidable.