The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem

• Published in: The Journal of value inquiry Vol. 50; no. 1; pp. 21 - 31
• Main Author: Kaufman, Whitley R. P.
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-03-2016; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Education; Essays; Ethics; International Political Economy; Morality; Ontology; Philosophers; Philosophy; Public International Law; New York; United States > US; Double Effect; Standard Case; Moral Intuition; Loop Variant; Causal Chain
• ISSN: 0022-5363; 1573-0492
• DOI: 10.1007/s10790-014-9479-0

It is widely held by moral philosophers that J.J. Thomsons Loop Variant, a version of the Trolley Problem rst presented by her in 1985, decisively refutes the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) as the right explanation of our moral intuitions in the various trolley-type cases.This article discusses the doctrine of double effect and the trolley problem. Defenders of the DDE have long cited the trolley cases as an important body of evidence supporting the intuitive plausibility of the DDE. But opponents of the DDE point to the Loop case as providing a decisive counterexample to the DDE, sufcient to reject it completely.