Dilemma of the Equality: an All-pay Contest with Individual Differences in Resource Holding Potential
An all-pay contest in which many players compete for an indivisible resource and each player continuously maintains a different resource holding potential (RHP) is analysed. There exists the unique pure ESS function, which is common sense; that is, a higher RHP induces a higher level of investment,...
Saved in:
| Published in: | Journal of theoretical biology Vol. 198; no. 3; pp. 395 - 404 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
England
Elsevier Ltd
07-06-1999
|
| Online Access: | Get full text |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Be the first to leave a comment!