It just feels right: an account of expert intuition

• Published in: Synthese (Dordrecht) Vol. 199; no. 1-2; pp. 1327 - 1346
• Main Authors: Fridland, Ellen, Stichter, Matt
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-12-2021; Springer Nature B.V
• Subjects: Control theory; Education; Epistemology; Logic; Metaphysics; Minds in Skilled Performance; Philosophy; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Science; Skills; Virtue; Skill; Control; Intuition; Action schema; Expertise
• ISSN: 0039-7857; 1573-0964
• DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02796-9

One of the hallmarks of virtue is reliably acting well. Such reliable success presupposes that an agent (1) is able to recognize the morally salient features of a situation, and the appropriate response to those features and (2) is motivated to act on this knowledge without internal conflict. Furthermore, it is often claimed that the virtuous person can do this (3) in a spontaneous or intuitive manner. While these claims represent an ideal of what it is to have a virtue, it is less clear how to make good on them. That is, how is it actually possible to spontaneously and reliably act well? In this paper, we will lay out a framework for understanding how it is that one could reliably act well in an intuitive manner. We will do this by developing the concept of an action schema, which draws on the philosophical and psychological literature on skill acquisition and self-regulation. In short, we will give an account of how self-regulation, grounded in skillful structures, can allow for the accurate intuitions and flexible expertise required for virtue. While our primary goal in this paper is to provide a positive theory of how virtuous intuitions might be accounted for, we also take ourselves to be raising the bar for what counts as an explanation of reliable and intuitive action in general.