Conviction and Punishment Free press and competitive election as deterrents to corruption

Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Public management review Vol. 11; no. 2; pp. 155 - 172
Main Authors:	Tian, Xiaowen, Io Lo, Vai
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Routledge 01-03-2009
Subjects:	competitive election conviction Corruption Democracy Elections free press Offenders Punishment
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	Democratic institutions are not equally effective in curbing corruption. Using a criminal behavior model, this study formulates the hypothesis that corruption offenders, being risk-inclined, are deterred more by conviction-reinforcing democratic institutions than by punishment-reinforcing democratic institutions. Evidence based on cross-country regressions strongly supports this hypothesis, indicating that compared with competitive election, free press is a more effective deterrent to corruption. While shedding light on why corruption remains rampant in some electoral democracies - particularly the illiberal democracies - this study identifies a key to corruption control.
Bibliography:	ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23
ISSN:	1471-9037 1471-9045
DOI:	10.1080/14719030802685479