On Everything Is Necessarily What It Is

It is argued that if everything is necessarily what it is, thengiven the equivalence ‘p≡[a= (℩x)(x=ap)]’, it follows that whateverhappens or is the case, had to happen or had to be the case.It is argued that if everything is necessarily what it is, then given the equivalence ‘p ≡ [a = (℩x)(x = a p)]...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Organon F Vol. 30; no. 3; pp. 278 - 280
Main Author:	Blum, Alex
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Filozofický ústav SAV 01-08-2023 Institute of Philosophy SAS Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Subjects:	(x) (₷x = x) Epistemology Ethics / Practical Philosophy fatalism identity necessity Philosophy the sole object Necessity The sole object (x) (₷x = x) Identity Fatalism
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	It is argued that if everything is necessarily what it is, thengiven the equivalence ‘p≡[a= (℩x)(x=ap)]’, it follows that whateverhappens or is the case, had to happen or had to be the case.It is argued that if everything is necessarily what it is, then given the equivalence ‘p ≡ [a = (℩x)(x = a p)]’, it follows that whatever happens or is the case, had to happen or had to be the case.
ISSN:	1335-0668 2585-7150
DOI:	10.31577/orgf.2023.30303