Radical Pragmatism in the Ethics of Belief

In this paper, I defend the view that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. This requires viewing beliefs as the predictable results of our actions. I will show how this fits with our intuitions about mental autonomy. The remainder of the paper consists in a defense against a seri...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Philosophia (Ramat Gan) Vol. 49; no. 1; pp. 403 - 419
Main Author:	Montplaisir, Samuel
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-03-2021
Subjects:	Education Epistemology Ethics Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Science Ethics of belief normative conflicts state-given reasons for belief pragmatic reasons for belief wrong kind of reasons non-epistemic reasons for belief
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	In this paper, I defend the view that only practical reasons are normative reasons for belief. This requires viewing beliefs as the predictable results of our actions. I will show how this fits with our intuitions about mental autonomy. The remainder of the paper consists in a defense against a series of objections that may be expected against this position. The paper concludes with a metaphilosophical explanation about our conflicting intuitions regarding the normativity of rationality.
ISSN:	0048-3893 1574-9274
DOI:	10.1007/s11406-020-00256-9