Revenge as the Dark Double of Retributive Punishment

Revenge as the Dark Double of Retributive Punishment

It is an assumption widely shared by both retributivists and anti-retributivists that revenge is a morally impermissible basis for inflicting harm. Retributivists have thus exercised great ingenuity in demonstrating that retribution is fundamentally different from revenge. But this is, I argue, to m...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophia (Ramat Gan) Vol. 44; no. 2; pp. 317 - 325
Main Author: Kaufman, Whitley R. P.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-06-2016
Subjects:
Education
Epistemology
Ethics
Philosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Science
Punishment
Honor
Revenge
Retribution
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:It is an assumption widely shared by both retributivists and anti-retributivists that revenge is a morally impermissible basis for inflicting harm. Retributivists have thus exercised great ingenuity in demonstrating that retribution is fundamentally different from revenge. But this is, I argue, to misconstrue the problem. The problem is rather to recognize the essential continuity between revenge and retribution, and to address the question whether there is a moral basis for the very idea of inflicting harm in response to moral wrongdoing. I argue that the only plausible such moral justification is the defense of honor, and that the debate needs to be focused on the legitimacy of honor as a moral basis for punishment.
ISSN:0048-3893
1574-9274
DOI:10.1007/s11406-015-9675-6