Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief

In this paper, I argue against the view that epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief. I begin by responding to some of the most widespread arguments in favor of the normativity of epistemic reasons before advancing two arguments against this thesis. The first is supported by an analysis o...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Acta analytica : philosophy and psychology Vol. 36; no. 4; pp. 573 - 587
Main Author:	Montplaisir, Samuel
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Dordrecht Springer Netherlands 01-12-2021 Springer Nature B.V
Subjects:	Education Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy Philosophy of Mind Ethics of belief State-given reasons for belief Pragmatic reasons for belief Normative conflicts Wrong kind of reasons Non-epistemic reasons for belief
Online Access:	Get full text
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Summary:	In this paper, I argue against the view that epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief. I begin by responding to some of the most widespread arguments in favor of the normativity of epistemic reasons before advancing two arguments against this thesis. The first is supported by an analysis of what it means to “have” some evidence for p. The second is supported by the claim that beliefs, if they are to be considered as states, cannot have epistemic reasons as normative reasons.
ISSN:	0353-5150 1874-6349
DOI:	10.1007/s12136-021-00469-x