Social construction and indeterminacy
An increasing number of philosophers argue that indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather than how the world is represented or known). The standard arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around the sorites par...
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| Published in: | Analytic philosophy Vol. 65; no. 1; pp. 37 - 52 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
01-03-2024
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| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | An increasing number of philosophers argue that indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather than how the world is represented or known). The standard arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in the social world because there is indeterminacy in how the social world is constructed. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-9596 2153-960X |
| DOI: | 10.1111/phib.12299 |