Reserving Rights: Explaining Human Rights Treaty Reservations

• Published in: International studies quarterly Vol. 64; no. 4; pp. 785 - 797
• Main Authors: Zvobgo, Kelebogile, Sandholtz, Wayne, Mulesky, Suzie
• Format: Journal Article
• Language: English
• Published: Oxford University Press 01-12-2020
• ISSN: 0020-8833; 1468-2478
• DOI: 10.1093/isq/sqaa070

Abstract
International relations scholarship has made significant strides in explaining how states design treaty obligations and why they accept treaty commitments. However, far less attention has been paid to factors that may influence states’ modification of their treaty obligations via reservations. We theorize that states will be more likely to enter reservations when treaty obligations increase compliance costs and policy adjustment costs. More specifically, we expect that demanding provisions, i.e., provisions that create strong, precise obligations requiring domestic action, will enhance the likelihood of reservation. To test our theory, we exploit an original dataset that codes reservations at the provision (treaty–article–paragraph) level for the ten core international human rights treaties. Consistent with our expectations, we find that states are more likely to enter reservations on more demanding treaty provisions. In contrast to prior studies, our results indicate that reservations are not driven purely by state-level characteristics such as regime type or the nature of the legal system. Rather, it appears that states weigh individual treaty obligations and calibrate their commitments accordingly.