Coevolution of cognition and cooperation in structured populations under reinforcement learning
We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With respect to other behavioral rules used in the literature, (i) we c...
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Published in: | Chaos, solitons and fractals Vol. 182; p. 114799 |
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Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier Ltd
01-05-2024
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With respect to other behavioral rules used in the literature, (i) we confirm the existence of a threshold value of the probability of repeated interaction, switching the emergent behavior from intuitive defector to dual-process cooperator; (ii) we find a different role of the node degree, with smaller degrees reducing the evolutionary success of dual-process cooperators; (iii) we observe a higher frequency of deliberation.
•Interactions structure and mode of cognition affect the evolution of cooperation.•Reinforcement learning (RL): a behavioral rule requiring small amount information.•Low probabilities of repeated interaction favor the intuitive defector behavior under RL.•Dual-process cooperation is favored for high probabilities of repeated interaction under RL.•Novelty: reinforcement learning promote cooperation on regular graph with high degree. |
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ISSN: | 0960-0779 1873-2887 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114799 |