Coevolution of cognition and cooperation in structured populations under reinforcement learning

We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With respect to other behavioral rules used in the literature, (i) we c...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Chaos, solitons and fractals Vol. 182; p. 114799
Main Authors: Mastrandrea, Rossana, Boncinelli, Leonardo, Bilancini, Ennio
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier Ltd 01-05-2024
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Summary:We study the evolution of behavior under reinforcement learning in a Prisoner’s Dilemma where agents interact in a regular network and can learn about whether they play one-shot or repeatedly by incurring a cost of deliberation. With respect to other behavioral rules used in the literature, (i) we confirm the existence of a threshold value of the probability of repeated interaction, switching the emergent behavior from intuitive defector to dual-process cooperator; (ii) we find a different role of the node degree, with smaller degrees reducing the evolutionary success of dual-process cooperators; (iii) we observe a higher frequency of deliberation. •Interactions structure and mode of cognition affect the evolution of cooperation.•Reinforcement learning (RL): a behavioral rule requiring small amount information.•Low probabilities of repeated interaction favor the intuitive defector behavior under RL.•Dual-process cooperation is favored for high probabilities of repeated interaction under RL.•Novelty: reinforcement learning promote cooperation on regular graph with high degree.
ISSN:0960-0779
1873-2887
DOI:10.1016/j.chaos.2024.114799