Properties of Open Procedure of Sequential Veto-Voting
Game-theoretic properties of joint decision making are considered. Procedures based on sequential open voting by veto are investigated. The paper is aimed at the question how to make voters’ behavior intuitively rational when they choose their optimal strategies. The review of the existing results i...
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Published in: | Moscow University computational mathematics and cybernetics Vol. 42; no. 4; pp. 177 - 185 |
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Main Authors: | , |
Format: | Journal Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Moscow
Pleiades Publishing
2018
Springer Nature B.V |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Game-theoretic properties of joint decision making are considered. Procedures based on sequential open voting by veto are investigated. The paper is aimed at the question how to make voters’ behavior intuitively rational when they choose their optimal strategies. The review of the existing results is also presented and the connection between them is established. Further research is discussed as well. |
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ISSN: | 0278-6419 1934-8428 |
DOI: | 10.3103/S0278641918040064 |