Properties of Open Procedure of Sequential Veto-Voting

Game-theoretic properties of joint decision making are considered. Procedures based on sequential open voting by veto are investigated. The paper is aimed at the question how to make voters’ behavior intuitively rational when they choose their optimal strategies. The review of the existing results i...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Moscow University computational mathematics and cybernetics Vol. 42; no. 4; pp. 177 - 185
Main Authors: Novikova, N. M., Pospelova, I. I.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Moscow Pleiades Publishing 2018
Springer Nature B.V
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Summary:Game-theoretic properties of joint decision making are considered. Procedures based on sequential open voting by veto are investigated. The paper is aimed at the question how to make voters’ behavior intuitively rational when they choose their optimal strategies. The review of the existing results is also presented and the connection between them is established. Further research is discussed as well.
ISSN:0278-6419
1934-8428
DOI:10.3103/S0278641918040064