Search Results - "Zwicker, William S."

Fair division of graphs and of tangled cakes by Igarashi, Ayumi, Zwicker, William S.

“…Fair division has been studied in both continuous and discrete contexts. One strand of the continuous literature seeks to award each agent with a single…”
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Cycles and Intractability in a Large Class of Aggregation Rules by Zwicker, William S.

“…We introduce the (j,k)-Kemeny rule -- a generalization of Kemeny's voting rule that aggregates j-chotomous weak orders into a k-chotomous weak order. Special…”
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The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids by Houy, Nicolas, Zwicker, William S.

“…Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote…”
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Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach by Duddy, Conal, Piggins, Ashley, Zwicker, William S.

“…We characterize a rule for aggregating binary evaluations—equivalently, dichotomous weak orders—similar in spirit to the Borda rule from the preference…”
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Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval by Freixas, Josep, Zwicker, William S.

“…Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or…”
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Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules by Sanver, M. Remzi, Zwicker, William S.

“…What is a monotonicity property? How should such a property be recast, so as to apply to voting rules that allow ties in the outcome? Our original interest was…”
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Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval by Freixas, Josep, Zwicker, William S.

“…In this paper we introduce the class of simple games with several ordered levels of approval in the input and in the output - the (j, k) simple games - and…”
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One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness by Sanver, M. Remzi, Zwicker, William S.

“…Suppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an…”
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Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings by Cervone, Davide P., Dai, Ronghua, Gnoutcheff, Daniel, Lanterman, Grant, Mackenzie, Andrew, Morse, Ari, Srivastava, Nikhil, Zwicker, William S.

“…We introduce some new voting rules based on a spatial version of the median known as the mediancentre, or Fermat-Weber point. Voting rules based on the mean…”
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Coalition formation games with separable preferences by Burani, Nadia, Zwicker, William S.

“…We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of stable coalitional structures in a purely hedonic game, that is in a coalition formation game such that…”
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Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC? by CERVONE, Davide P, GEHRLEIN, William V, ZWICKER, William S

“…Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as…”
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Almost envy-free allocations with connected bundles by Bilò, Vittorio, Caragiannis, Ioannis, Flammini, Michele, Igarashi, Ayumi, Monaco, Gianpiero, Peters, Dominik, Vinci, Cosimo, Zwicker, William S.

“…We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to…”
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The paradox of multiple elections by Brams, Steven J., Kilgour, D. Marc, Zwicker, William S.

“…Assume that voters must choose between voting yes (Y) and voting no (N) on three propositions on a referendum. If the winning combination is NYY on the first,…”
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Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? by Zwicker, William S.

“…Smith [J.H. Smith, Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate, Econometrica 41 (1973) 1027–1041] and Young [H.P. Young, A note on preference…”
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Voting on referenda: the separability problem and possible solutions by Brams, Steven J, Kilgour, D Marc, Zwicker, William S

“…Assume that voters choose between yes (Y) and no (N) on two related propositions in a referendum, where YN, for example, signifies voting Y on the first and N…”
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A characterization of the rational mean neat voting rules by Zwicker, William S.

“…A mean proximity rule is a voting rule having a mean proximity representation in Euclidean space. Legal ballots are represented as vectors that form the…”
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A moving-knife solution to the four-person envy-free cake-division problem by Brams, Steven J., Taylor, Alan D., Zwicker, William S.

“…We present a moving-knife procedure, requiring only 11 cuts, that produces an envy-free allocation of a cake among four players and discuss possible extensions…”
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Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano, Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power, Cambridge University Press (2008) 184 pages by Zwicker, William S

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Annick Laruelle Federico Valenciano Voting and Collective Decision Making: Bargaining and Power 2008 Cambridge University Press 184 pages by Zwicker, William S.

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Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice by Brandt, Felix, Zwicker, William S.

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