A dilemma for conferralism
Abstract Conferralism is the view that social properties are neither intrinsic to the things that have them nor possessed simply by virtue of their causal or spatiotemporal relations to other things, but are somehow bestowed (intentionally or not, explicitly or not) upon them by persons who have bot...
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| Published in: | Analysis (Oxford) |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
19-09-2024
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| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Abstract Conferralism is the view that social properties are neither intrinsic to the things that have them nor possessed simply by virtue of their causal or spatiotemporal relations to other things, but are somehow bestowed (intentionally or not, explicitly or not) upon them by persons who have both the capacity and the standing to bestow them. We argue that conferralism faces a dilemma: either it is viciously circular, or it is limited in scope in a way that undercuts its motivation. |
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| ISSN: | 0003-2638 1467-8284 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/analys/anae028 |