Search Results - "VIEILLE, Nicolas"

Stochastic games by Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…In 1953, Lloyd Shapley contributed his paper “Stochastic games” to PNAS. In this paper, he defined the model of stochastic games, which were the first general…”
Get full text

ON THE EFFICIENCY OF SOCIAL LEARNING by Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We revisit prominent learning models in which a sequence of agents make a binary decision on the basis of both a private signal and information related to past…”
Get full text

Zero-sum games with ambiguity by Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study whether the basic tenets of the theory of zero-sum games are still valid when players are uncertainty averse. We focus on games with one-sided…”
Get full text

Corrigendum to “Informational externalities and emergence of consensus” [Games Econ. Behav. 66 (2) (2009) 979–994] by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…Rosenberg et al. (2009) studied the convergence of equilibrium behavior to consensus in social networks. In this corrigendum, we correct the condition required…”
Get full text

Optimal dynamic information provision by Renault, Jérôme, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a dynamic model of information provision. A state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. An advisor with commitment power decides how much…”
Get full text

Stationary Social Learning in a Changing Environment by Levy, Raphaël, Pęski, Marcin, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We consider social learning in a changing world. With changing states, societies can be responsive only if agents regularly act upon fresh information, which…”
Get full text

Bureaucracy in quest of feasibility by Crès, Hervé, Gilboa, Itzhak, Vieille, Nicolas

“…A bureaucracy has to determine the values of many decision variables while satisfying a set of constraints. The bureaucracy is not assumed to have any…”
Get full text

TRUTHFUL EQUILIBRIA IN DYNAMIC BAYESIAN GAMES by Hörner, Johannes, Takahashi, Satoru, Vieille, Nicolas

“…This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on…”
Get full text

On games of strategic experimentation by Rosenberg, Dinah, Salomon, Antoine, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to…”
Get full text

Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a two-player one-arm bandit problem in discrete time, in which the risky arm can have two possible types, high and low, the decision to stop…”
Get full text

Dynamic sender–receiver games by Renault, Jérôme, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We consider a dynamic version of sender–receiver games, where the sequence of states follows an irreducible Markov chain observed by the sender. Under mild…”
Get full text

Informational externalities and emergence of consensus by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and…”
Get full text

Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case by Cardaliaguet, Pierre, Rainer, Catherine, Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study the asymptotics of a class of two-player, zero-sum stochastic game with incomplete information on one side when the time span between two consecutive…”
Get full text

Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem by Hörner, Johannes, Sugaya, Takuo, Takahashi, Satoru, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We present an algorithm to compute the set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs as the discount factor tends to 1 for stochastic games with observable states…”
Get full text

Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons by Hörner, Johannes, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are…”
Get full text

Computing Uniformly Optimal Strategies in Two-Player Stochastic Games by Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We provide a computable algorithm to calculate uniform ε-optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our approach can be used to construct…”
Get full text

Strategic information exchange by Rosenberg, Dinah, Solan, Eilon, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems…”
Get full text

Aggregation of multiple prior opinions by Crès, Hervé, Gilboa, Itzhak, Vieille, Nicolas

“…Experts are asked to provide their advice in a situation of uncertainty. They adopt the decision makerʼs utility function, but each has a potentially different…”
Get full text

Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information by Cardaliaguet, Pierre, Rainer, Catherine, Rosenberg, Dinah, Vieille, Nicolas

“…We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The…”
Get full text

On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games by Hörner, Johannes, Takahashi, Satoru, Vieille, Nicolas

“…This paper provides a dual characterization of the existing ones for the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs in a class of finite stochastic games…”
Get full text